Abstract. We show the convergence of finite state symmetric N -player differential games, where players control their transition rates from state to state, to a limiting dynamics given by a finite state Mean Field Game system made of two coupled forward-backward ODEs. We exploit the so-called Master Equation, which in this finite-dimensional framework is a first order PDE in the simplex of probability measures, obtaining the convergence of the feedback Nash equilibria, the value functions and the optimal trajectories. The convergence argument requires only the regularity of a solution to the Master Equation. Moreover, we employ the convergence method to prove a Central Limit Theorem and a Large Deviation Principle for the evolution of the N -player empirical measures. The well-posedness and regularity of solution to the Master Equation are also studied.
Introduction
Mean Field Games were introduced independently by Lasry and Lions [21] and by Huang et al. [18] as limit models for symmetric non-zero-sum non-cooperative N -player dynamic games when the number N of players tends to infinity. For an introduction to the topic see for e.g. [4] , [6] or [2] , where the latter two deal also with mean-field type optimal control. While a wide range of different classes of Mean Field Games has been considered up to now, here we focus on finite time horizon problems with continuous time dynamics under fully symmetric cost structure and complete information, where the position of each agent belongs to a finite state space.
The relation between the N -player game and its limit can be studied in two opposite directions: approximation and convergence. The approximation argument consists in proving that the solutions to the Mean Field Game allow to construct approximate Nash equilibria for the prelimit game, where the error in the approximation tends to zero as N goes to infinity. Convergence goes in the opposite direction: are Nash equilibria for the N -player game converging to solutions of the Mean Field Game when the number of players goes to infinity?
Results in the first direction are much more common and easier to obtain: for the diffusive case without jumps see for instance [18] , [6] , [7] and [3] . In the finite state space setting, this was achieved in [1] studying the infinitesimal generator, while in [8] an approximation result was found through a fully probabilistic approach, which allowed for less restrictive assumptions on the dynamics and the optimization costs. For the convergence case results are fewer and even more recent: while the limits of N -player Nash equilibria in stochastic open-loop strategies can be completely characterized (see [20] and [14] for the diffusion case), the convergence problem for Nash equilibria in feedback form with full information is more difficult. A result in this direction is given by [16] in our finite state setting, via the infinitesimal generator, but only if the time horizon is small.
A breakthrough was achieved by Cardaliaguet et al. [5] through the use of the Master Equation, again in the continuous state space case. Their convergence argument relies on having a regular solution to the Master Equation, which in the diffusion case is a kind of infinite dimensional transport equation on the space of probability measures. As we will see in the following, it is strongly related to the Mean Field Game system: its solution provides a solution to the Mean Field Game for any initial time and initial distribution. Conditioning upon having a regular solution to the Master Equation, the crucial ingredient for proving the convergence consists in a coupling argument, in a similar fashion to the propagation of chaos property for uncontrolled systems (see [17] ). Such coupling, in which independent copies of the limit process are compared to their prelimit counterparts, ultimately allows to get the desired convergence of the value functions of the N -player game to the solution of the Master Equation.
In this paper, we focus on the convergence of feedback Nash equilibria in the finite state space scenario. We follow the approach of [5] , showing the convergence of the value functions of the N -player game to solutions of the Master Equation. The argument provides also the convergence of the feedback Nash equilibria and a propagation of chaos property for the associated optimal trajectories. The coupling technique necessary for the proof is the main motivation for writing the dynamics of the N players as a stochastic differential equation driven by Poisson Random measures, as in [8] .
In order to motivate the present work, we introduce the equations in play at a formal level. We begin by defining the dynamics of the N -player game, given by the following system of controlled SDEs:
(1)
for i = 1, . . . , N , where each X i (t) is a process taking values in the finite space Σ = {1, . . . , d} and we denote by X t := (X 1 (t), . . Under our framework, we will show that there exists a unique feedback Nash equilibrium for the N - , where a precise definition of D m U , the derivative with respect to a probability measure, will be given in the next section. Then, H(x i , ∆ i v N,i ) → H(x, ∆ x U ), so that we can now study the term:
It is a first order PDE stated in P (Σ), the simplex of probability measures in R d . A similar equation, but stated in the whole space R d , was studied in [23] , proving the well-posedness and regularity under strong monotonicity assumptions. Here we solve it using the method developed in [5] : under slightly weaker conditions, we show that the Mean Field Game system can be seen as the characteristic curves of (M) and linearize it around its solution.
Here, we also study the empirical measure process of the N -player optimal trajectories. Indeed, the convergence obtained allows to get a Central Limit Theorem and a Large Deviation Principle for the asymptotic behavior, as N tends to infinity, of such processes. The key point for proving these results is to compare the prelimit optimal trajectories with the ones in which each player chooses the control induced by the Master Equation. The fluctuations are then found by analyzing the associated infinitesimal generator, while the Large Deviation properties are derived using a result in [12] . Finally, we mention that such properties are being studied in the diffusion case, independently, via the Master Equation approach, by Lacker et al. [11] .
Structure of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we start with the notations and the definition of derivatives in the simplex. Then we present the two sets of assumptions we make use of: one for the convergence and the fluctuations results while the other, stronger, for the regularity of the Master Equation; we also show an example in which the assumptions are satisfied. Finally, we give a detailed description of both the N -player game and the limit model. Section 3 contains the convergence results and their proofs, while in Section 4 we employ the convergence method to derive the probabilistic properties of the empirical measure process, that is, the Large Deviation Principle and the Central Limit Theorem. Section 5 analyzes the well-posedness and regularity of the solution to the Master Equation. We conclude with Section 6 by summarizing all the main results.
Model and assumptions
2.1. Notations. Here we briefly clarify the notations used throughout the paper. First of all, we are considering Σ = {1, . . . , d} to be the finite state space of any player. Let T be the finite time horizon and A a compact metric space, the space of control values. Furthermore, we choose
d , for κ, M > 0; this guarantees for the dynamics of all players that P (X(t) = x) > 0 for every x in Σ and for all times t. Let Ξ := [0, M ] d and ν be a Radon measure on Ξ. Denote by
the space of probability measures on Σ. Besides the euclidean distance (denoted with | · |), we may interchangeably use the Wasserstein metric d 1 on P (Σ) since all metrics are equivalent. We observe that the simplex P (Σ) is a compact and convex subset of R d . In the dynamics given by equation (1) , f : Σ × Ξ × A → {−d, . . . , d} has to be a measurable function such that f (x, ξ, a) ∈ {1 − x, . . . , d − x}. Specifically, throughout the paper we set
The measures N i appearing in (1) are N i.i.d. stationary Poisson random measures on [0, T ] × Ξ with intensity measure ν on Ξ. We fix a probability space (Ω, F , P) and denote by F = (F t ) t∈ [0,T ] the filtration generated by the Poisson measures. We make the following specific choice for ν(dξ)
for any E ∈ B(Ξ), where ℓ is the Lebesgue measure on R and Ξ j := {u ∈ Ξ : u i = 0 ∀i = j}. The initial datum of the N -player game is represented by N i.i.d. random variables Z 1 , . . . , Z N with values in Σ and distributed as m 0 ∈ P (Σ). The vector Z = (Z 1 , . . . , Z N ) is in particular exchangeable, in the sense that the joint distribution is invariant under permutations, and is assumed to be F 0 -measurable, i.e. independent of the noise.
The state of player i at time t is denoted by X i (t), with X t := (X 1 (t), . . is the empirical measure of all the players except the i-th. Clearly, they are P (Σ)-valued stochastic processes. In the limiting dynamics, the empirical measure is replaced by a deterministic flow of probability measures m :
In choosing his/her strategy, each player minimizes the sum of three costs: a Lagrangian L : Σ × A −→ R, a running cost F : Σ × P (Σ) −→ R and a final cost G : Σ × P (Σ) −→ R (see next section for the precise definition of the N -player game). The Hamiltonian H is defined as the Legendre transform of L:
When we have a function g : Σ N → R we denote with ∆ j g(x) ∈ R d the first finite difference with respect to the j-th coordinate. It is useful to observe that
We also use the notation u(t) :
. , u(t, d)).
We now introduce the concept of variation with respect to a probability measure m of a function U (m).
Definition 1. We say that a function
Morally, we can think of [D m U (m, y)] z as the (right) directional derivative of U with respect to m along the direction δ z − δ y . We also observe that m + s(δ z − δ y ) might be outside of the probability simplex (e.g. when we are at the boundary), in which case we consider the limit only across admissible directions. However, note that, for our purposes this is not really a problem: since in the limit m(t) will be the distribution of the reference player, the bound from below for the control ensures that the boundary of the simplex will never be touched.
Together with the definition, we state an identity which will come useful in the following sections: (8) [
Its derivation is an immediate consequence of the linearity of the directional derivatives. We can easily extend the above definition to the case of derivative with respect to a direction µ ∈ P 0 (Σ), with
for each y ∈ Σ, since z =y µ z (δ z − δ y ) = z =y µ z δ z − z =y µ z δ y , and z =y µ z = −µ y . This remark allows us to define the derivative of U (m) along the direction µ ∈ P 0 (Σ) as a map for every y ∈ Σ and for this reason we will fix y = 1 when needed in the equations. Indeed, by means of identity (8) and the fact that µ ∈ P 0 (Σ),
Assumptions.
We now summarize the assumptions we make, which are different according on the results. Because of the compactness of A, the continuity of L with respect to its second argument is sufficient for guaranteeing the existence and finiteness of the supremum in (4) for each (x, p). Moreover, we assume that there exists a unique maximizer α * (x, p) in the definition of H for every (x, p):
With our choices for f in (2) and the intensity measure ν in (3), a sufficient condition for the above assertion is given by the strict convexity of L in α (see Lemma 3 in [8] 
for any m ∈ P (Σ) and µ ∈ P 0 (Σ). Observe that the assumptions on H allow for quadratic Hamiltonian. As we will see, the above assumptions imply both the boundedness and Lipschitz continuity of ∆ x U with respect to m and the boundedness and Lipschitz continuity of D m U with respect to m. We conclude the section with an example for which all the assumptions are verified. (1, . . . , 1) T and b a large enough constant to be chosen. The computation of 2.3. N-Player Game. In this section we describe the N -player game in a general setting. Namely, we suppose that each individual has complete information on the states of all the other players and we do not require the players to be symmetric. Then, we show the relation between system (HJB) and the concept of Nash equilibria for the game through a classical Verification Theorem. To this end, neither hypotheses that guarantee the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are actually needed (e.g. strict convexity of the Lagrangian).
In the prelimit the dynamics are given by the system of N controlled SDE (17) With the choice of f in (2) and the intensity measure ν in (3), the dynamics remain in Σ for any time and the feedback controls are exactly the transition rates of the continuous time Markov chains X i (t). Indeed, one can prove that (see [8] ), for x = y,
So whenever α denotes the rates of the Markov chain, we will set α 
The optimality condition for the N -player game is given by the usual concept of Nash equilibria. For a strategy vector
Then, we can introduce the following
Definition 2. A strategy vector α N is a Nash equilibrium for the N -player game if for each
We consider now the value functions of the problem v N,i (t, x) and define
We work under hypotheses that guarantee the existence of a unique maximizer α * (x, p) defined in (11) . With these notations, the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system associated to the above differential game is given by: (20) ∂v ∂t
Using the uniqueness of the maximizer α * (x, p), Equation (20) can be rewritten as the system (HJB) presented in the introduction
This is a system of N d N coupled ODE's, whose well-posedness for all T > 0 can be proved through standard ODEs techniques, because of the Lipschitz continuity of the vector fields involved in the equations.
We are now able to relate system (HJB) to the Nash equilibria for the N -player game through the following
. . , N be a classical solution to system (HJB). Then the feedback strategy vector
defines a unique Nash equilibrium for the N -player game and
are the value functions.
Proof. Let β ∈ A be any feedback and X t,x the corresponding solution to (17) , given the strategy vector [α N * −i ; β]; denote for simplicity X = X t,x . Fixing i = 1, . . . , N , Equation (20) gives ∂v ∂t
for any t, x. Applying first Itô formula (Theorem II.5.1 in [19] , p. 66) and then Lemma 3 in [8] and the above inequality, we obtain
Replacing β by α i * the inequalities become equalities.
Remark 1. It is important to observe that the solution v N,i to (HJB) is uniformly bounded with respect to N . Namely, there exists a constant
K > 0 such that sup x∈Σ N |v N,i (t, x)| ≤ K,
where the constant K is independent of N , i and t. This and (5) immediately impliy an analogous bound for
|∆ i v N,i (t, x
)|: it is for this reason that the only local regularity (assumptions (H1) and (RegH)) for H(x, p) with respect to p is enough for getting the convergence and well-posedness results.
We are interested in studying the limit of the (HJB) system as N → ∞ under symmetric properties for the N -player game. Namely, we assume that the players are all identical and indistinguishable. In practice, this symmetry is expressed through the following mean-field assumption on the costs:
An easy but crucial consequence of assumption (M-F) and the uniqueness of solution to system (HJB) is that the solution v N,i of such system enjoys symmetric properties:
is invariant under permutations of (y 1 , . . . , y N −1 ).
Proof. Letx be defined from x after exchanging x k with x j , for
and thus, by the uniqueness of solution to (HJB) we conclude v
The above proposition motivates the study of a possible convergence of system (HJB) to a limiting system, by analyzing directly the limit of the function v N .
Mean Field Game and Master Equation.
The limit as N → ∞ would expectedly be characterized by a continuum of players in which the representative agent evolves according to the dynamics
where the law of the initial condition Z is m 0 and N is a Poisson Random measure with intensity measure ν. The controls are feedbacks in A, which denotes the space of measurable functions
The empirical measure of the N players is replaced by a deterministic flow of probability measures m :
In literature, such limiting dynamics are described by the celebrated Mean Field Game system, whose unknowns are two functions (u, m). The equation in u describes the dynamics of the value function of the reference player, which optimizes his/her payoff under the influence of the collective behavior of the others, while the equation in m describes the evolution of the distribution of the players. In our discrete setting the Mean Field Game system takes the following form of a strongly coupled system of ODEs:
with α * (x, p) as defined in (11) 
As already mentioned, recently in [5] a new technique involving the use of the so-called Master Equation was introduced to get the exact relation between symmetric N -Player Differential Games and Mean Field Games. Generally speaking, the Master Equation summarizes all the information needed to get solutions to the Mean Field Game: namely, one can prove that the system (MFG) provides the characteristics curves for (M). Indeed,
being the solution to the Mean Field Game system (MFG) starting at time t 0 up to time T , with m(t 0 ) = m 0 . Moreover, in the Introduction we already motivated heuristically the convergence result of system (HJB) to the Master Equation (M). As it will be clear from the convergence argument, all that is needed is the existence of a regular solution to (M).
To be specific on the needed regularity, we conclude this section with the definition of regular solution to (M). 
Definition 3. A function
U : [0, T ] × Σ × P (Σ) → R is said to be a classical solution to (M) if it is continuous in all its arguments, C 1 in t and C 1 in m and, for any (t, x, m) ∈ [0, T ] × Σ × P (Σ) we have − ∂U ∂t + H(x, ∆ x U ) − Σ D m U (t, x, m, y) · α * (y, ∆ y U (t, y, m))dm(y) = F (x, m), U (T, x, m) = G(x, m), (x, m) ∈ Σ × P (Σ). In particular then ∆ x U (t, x, ·) : P (Σ) → R d is
The convergence argument
In this section we take for granted the well-posedeness of the Master Equation (M) and focus on the study of the convergence. We give the precise statement of the convergence in terms of two theorems: the first one describes the convergence in average of the solutions of the two equations, while the second one is a propagation of chaos for the optimal trajectories.
For any i ∈ {1, . . . , N } and x ∈ Σ, set
where x = (x 1 , . . . , x N ), and
The main result is given by the following
Theorem 1. Assume (H1) and that (M) admits a unique regular solution U in the sense of Definition 3. Fix
N ≥ 1, (t 0 , m 0 ) ∈ [0, T ] × P (Σ), x ∈ Σ N and let (v N,i ) be
the solution to (HJB). Then
In (26) and (27) , the constant C does not depend on i, t 0 , m 0 nor N .
As stated above, the convergence can be studied also in terms of the optimal trajectories. Consider the optimal trajectories
We remark that Law(X i (t)) = m(t) with m the solution to the Mean Field Game.
Theorem 2.
Under the same hypotheses of Theorem (1) , for any N ≥ 1 and any i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, we have
for some constant C > 0 independent of t 0 , m 0 and N . In particular we obtain the Law of Large numbers
3.1. Approximating the optimal trajectories. The first step in the proof of these results is to show that the projection of U onto empirical measures
x ) satisfies the system (HJB) up to a term of order O( 1 N ). The following proposition makes rigorous the intuition we already used in the heuristic derivation of the Master Equation (M).
Proposition 3. Let U be a regular solution to the Master Equation and u
N,i (t, x) be defined as in (32) . Then
By standard computations we get
where the last equality is derived by exploiting the Lipschitz continuity in m of
For every component h of D m U we have found the thesis, and thus the same holds for the whole vector.
In what follows, C will denote any constant independent of i, N, t 0 , m 0 which is allowed to change from line to line. In the next proposition we show that the u N,i 's almost solve the system (HJB):
Computing the equation in (t, x i , m N,i
x ) we get (we omit the * in α * for simplicity)
with the correct final condition u
. By definition of empirical measure we can rewrite
Recalling that, by Proposition 3,
we deduce
For the first term we add and subtract the quantity α(
For (A) we have, using first the Lipschitz continuity of α with respect to the second variable and then the lipschitz continuity of ∆ x U with respect to m:
where the last inequality is a consequence of Proposition 3, for which
, and by the bound on ||D m U || ∞ for the solution to (M). Part (B) of 1) is instead what we want to obtain in the equation for u N,i , so we leave it as it is. For the term 2), we simply note that α is bounded from above by definition, and thus the whole term 2) is also of order O 
Observe that the processes X and Y are exchangeable. For future use, let us also recall the inequality
for every x, y ∈ Σ N . The result needed to prove the main theorems is the following 
Proof. In order to prove (38), we apply the Itô Formula to the function Ψ(t,
and, as above,
It follows that,
Now, integrating on the time interval [t, T ] we get:
For brevity, for the remaining part of the proof we set u
. Next, we take the conditional expectation on the initial data Z, i.e. E Z = E[ · |Y t = Z]; notice that we are allowed to condition on such event since it has positive probability, thanks to the bound from below of the jump rates. Applying again Lemma 3 of [8] , we obtain
Let us first study the term E
Applying equations (33) and (HJB) we get:
Note that we also added and subtracted α j · ∆ j u i s in the last line so that we can use the lipschitz properties of H, D p H and the bound on r N,i to get the correct estimates (as in [5] ). Specifically, we can rewrite
Putting things together,
On the other hand, observing that
) (× being the element by element product between vectors and 1 = (1, . . . , 1) T ), the expression
can be simplified as follows
Thus, we have found
Now, we use again the expression for
so that we can rewrite the previous as
Recalling that α j ≥ 0 since it is a vector of rates of transitions, we can estimate the left hand side as
This also implies, erasing the terms with j = i in the left hand side,
For the boundedness of α i from below and above (recall that the admissible controls α are such
We now use the Lipschitz continuity of H, α j ,α j (assumption (H1)) and the bounds on ||r (3) and (4) to obtain
By the convexity inequality ab ≤ ǫa 2 + b 2 4ǫ we can further estimate the right hand side to get
By Gronwall's Lemma, we can write
Taking the expectation and using the exchangeability of the processes (Y j,t ) j=1,...N we obtain (38). In order to derive (39), we consider (40) in t = 0 and average over i = 1, . . . , N , so that we get
which immediately implies (39) almost surely. We now estimate the difference X i − Y i . Thanks to equations (34) and (28) and the Lipschitz continuity in x and α of the dinamics f (see Lemma 
where we applied (38) and the Lipschitz continuity of ∆ x U in the last inequality. Then inequality (35) and the exchangeability of (X, Y ) yield
and by Gronwall's inequality we get (36). Finally (36), applying again (35), gives (37).
Proofs of the main results.
We are now in the position to prove the main results.
Proof. (Theorem 1)
For Equation (26) we just compute (39) for Z uniformly distributed on Σ; this yields
Then, we can replace
x ) with U (t 0 , x i , m N x ) using the Lipschitz continuity of U with respect to m, the additional error term being of order 1/N . For (27), we compute
where in the last inequality the initial data Z = (Z 1 , . . . , Z N ) are distributed as m 0 .
By (38), the first term in (42) is of order 1/N . For the second term we further estimate, using again the Lipschitz continuity of U with respect to m,
where for the last inequality we used that Finally, we get to the proof of the propagation of chaos (Theorem 2). Recall that the Y i,t 's are the optimal processes, i.e. the solutions to system (28), the X i,t are the processes associated to the functions u N,i , i.e. they solve system (34), while theX i,t are the decoupled limit processes (they solve system (29)) to which we would like to prove convergence. First, we need the following lemma, whose proof can be found for example in [24] :
random variables with values in a one dimensional space, with law m t . Then
Notice that the supremum is taken inside the mean, giving thus a slow convergence of order N −1/9 , while if the supremum were taken outside the convergence would be of order N −1/2 by [15] .
Proof. (Theorem 2)
The assertion of the theorem is proved if we show that
Indeed, by the triangle inequality and (36) in Theorem 3 we can estimate
We are then left to prove (44). As in the proof of (36), we have
By the Lispchitz continuity of the optimal controls, and of ∆ x U , we can write
Using (43) of Lemma 1 and the exchangeability of the processes, we obtain
which, by Gronwall's Lemma, ends the proof of (30). Finally (31) follows from (30) and (43), using also (35).
Fluctuations and Large Deviations
The convergence results, Theorem 1 and 2, allow to derive immediately a Large Deviation Principle for the empirical measure process of the N -player game, when choosing the optimal control. First of all, we recall from Proposition 2 that, for any i, the value function v N,i of player i in the N -player game is invariant under permutation of (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x N ) . This is equivalent to say that the value functions can be viewed as functions of the empirical measure of the system, i.e. there exists a map
4.1. Dynamics of the empirical measure process. We consider then trajectories of the empirical measure process of the optimal evolution Y (defined in(28)) of the N -player game. If the system is in x at time t, then the rate at which player i goes from x i to y is given, via the optimal control, by 
(t) = Γ(t, m(t))
T m(t)
where Γ is the matrix defined by
and U is the solution to the Master Equation.
Viewing m(t) as a Markov process, its infinitesimal generator is given, at time t, by
for any g : P (Σ) −→ R. Thanks to (8) , the generator can be equivalently written as
We will also consider the empirical measure of the process X defined in (34), in which each player chooses the same control Γ x,y independent of N . We denote by η (53) to a limiting generator of a diffusion process to be determined (see for e.g. [9] , [10] for reference). Before stating the theorem we observe that the process (53) has values in P 0 (Σ), which in the following we treat as a subset of R d .
Theorem 4 (Central Limit Theorem). Let U be a regular solution to the Master Equation and assume (37). Then the fluctuation flow ρ N t in (53) converges as N → ∞, in the sense of weak convergence of stochastic processes, to a limiting process ρ t which is the solution of the following SDE
for y ∈ Σ, µ ∈ P 0 (Σ), and σ ∈ R d×d is given by the relations
)). (57)
In particular the matrix σ 2 is the opposite of the generator of a Markov chain, is symmetric and positive semidefinite with one null eigenvalue, and the same properties hold for σ, meaning that ρ t ∈ P 0 (Σ) for any t.
Proof. The key observation is that we can reduce ourselves to study the asymptotics of the fluctuation flow
, which is more standard since η N t , whose generator M is defined in (52), is the empirical measure of an uncontrolled system of N mean-field interacting particles. Indeed, by (37) we have that √ N (m N − η N ) tends to 0 almost surely as N goes to infinity. Thus, it remains to prove the convergence in law of (58) (22) and (28). Then, we compute the generator of (58) for t ≥ 0. Now we note that µ N t is obtained from η N t through a time dependent, linear invertible transformation
Thus, the generator H N t of (58) can be written as
for a g : P 0 (Σ) → R regular and with compact support (we can extend the definition of g to be a smooth function in the whole space R d , so that the usual derivatives are well defined). We have
where the second equality follows from the KFP equation for m t . For the remaining part in the expression (59) we have
Thus, we have found
In order to perform a Taylor expansion of the generator, we develop the term
Substituting, we get
Now, we note that
because y Γ x,y = 0. This property allows us to rewrite
Then, using the Lipschitz continuity of Γ as we did in Proposition 3, we linearize the term
We thus deduce
where
The proof is then completed if we show that the generator (60) is associated to the SDE (54). The drift component can be immediately identified, since
,
For the diffusion component, we first note that, for x, y ∈ Σ
if we define (σ 2 ) x,y∈Σ by the relations (56) and (57). Finally, we observe that the limiting process ρ t defined in (54) takes values in P 0 (Σ), as required. Indeed, by diagonalizing σ 2 (which is symmetric and such that its rows sum to 0) we can get that all the eigenvectors, besides the constant one relative to the null eigenvalue, have components which sum to 0 (by orthogonality). The same properties hold for the square root matrix σ, so that equation (54) preserves the space P 0 (Σ).
Large Deviation Principle.
We state the large deviation result, which is a sample path LDP on D([0, T ], P (Σ)). To define the rate function, we first introduce the local rate function
: q x,y ≥ 0, 
We remark that the initial conditions are assumed to be deterministic only for simplicity, otherwise there would be another term in the rate function I. Before proving the Theorem, let us give another characterization of I. For m ∈ P (Σ) and θ ∈ R d , define 
Define I 0 as in (63) but with Λ replaced by Λ 0 . Via a standard result in convex analysis, Proposition 6.2 in [12] shows that Λ = Λ 0 and then I = I 0 . Several authors studied large deviation properties of mean field interacting processes similar to ours. However, most of them deal with the case in which the prelimit jump rates, m N x Γ N , are constant and equal to the limiting rates m x Γ; see e.g. [22] , [26] and [25] . We mention that in this latter paper, as in many others, it is also assumed that the jump rates of the prelimit process are bounded below and away from 0; this does not apply to our case, since the number of agents in a state x could be 0, implying that m x Γ N x,y might also be 0. To prove the claim, we apply the results in [12] : to our knowledge, it is the first paper which proves a Large Deviation Principle considering the jump rates of any player depending on N (and deals also with systems with simultaneous jumps). Theorem 3.4.1 in [27] shows, however, the exponential equivalence of the processes m N and the processes η N given by (52) in which the jump rates of the prelimit system m x Γ N are replaced by m x Γ, which does not depend on N ; the proof uses a coupling of the two Markov chains. These results are derived assuming the following properties:
(1) the dynamics of any agent is ergodic and the jump rates are uniformly bounded; (2) for each x, y ∈ Σ, the limiting jump rates Γ x,y are Lipschitz continuous in m; (3) for each x, y ∈ Σ, given any sequence m 
Proof. (Theorem 5)
The fact that I is a good rate function, i.e condition (iii), is proved for instance in Theorem 1.1 of [13] . Due to Theorem 3.9 in [12] , in order to prove the claims (i) and (ii) it is enough to show (69). Actually [12] studies time homogeneous Markov processes, but their results are still true if the convergence (69) is uniform over time. Assume then (26) and let
The first term goes to zero, uniformly over time, thanks to (26):
While B converges to 0, uniformly over t, by the regularity of U :
The Master Equation: well-posedness and regularity
In this section we study the well-posedness of equation (M) under the assumptions of monotonicity and regularity for F, G, H we already introduced (Mon), (RegFG), (RegH). A preliminary remark is that, thanks to Proposition 1 in [16] , if H is differentiable (and this is indeed the case of our assumptions) then
For this reason, we will in the following use α * interchangeably with −D p H.
Theorem 6. Assume (Mon), (RegFG) and (RegH). Then there exists a unique classical solution to (M) in the sense of Definition 3. Moreover it is regular.
The method of proof follows from the renowned method of characteristics, which consists in proving that
solves (M), u being the solution of the Mean Field Game system (MFG). Firs of all, in order to perform the computations, we have to prove the regularity in m of the function U (t 0 , x, m) defined above. In particular, we have to show that D m U exists and it is bounded. For this, we follow the strategy shown in [5] -which is developed in infinite dimension -adapting it to our discrete setting. The idea consists in studying the well-posedness and regularity properties of the linearized version of the system (MFG), whose solution will end up coinciding with D m U · µ 0 , for all possible directions µ 0 ∈ P 0 (Σ).
5.1.
Estimates on the Mean Field Game system. We start by proving the well-posedness of the system (MFG)
and a useful a priori estimate on its solution (u, m). The existence of solutions follows from a standard fixed point argument: see Proposition 4 of [16] . Let us remark that any flow of measures m lies in the space Step 1. Use of Monotonicity. The couple (u, m) solves
Using the fact that x α * x (y) = 0 we can rewrite
We apply the monotonicity of F and G to the first line and the uniform convexity of H to the last two lines. In fact, recalling that α *
, by (RegH) we have that, for each x,
Hence we obtain
Step 
Thus the boundedness and Lipschitz continuity of the rates give
and hence, by Gronwall's Lemma,
This, together with inequality (75), yields
Step 3. Estimate on Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation Integrating the first equation in (74) over [t, T ] we get
Using the Lipschitz continuity of F, G, H and the bound max
and then Gronwall's Lemma gives
This bound (78) and estimate (77) yield claim (73). Again (78) finally proves claim (72).
5.2.
Linearized MFG system and regularity. For proving Theorem 6 we need to introduce the linearized version of system (MFG) around its solutions and then prove that it provides the derivative of u(t 0 , x) with respect to the initial condition m 0 .
As a preliminar step, we study a related linear system of ODE's, which will come useful several times.
(79)
The unknowns are z and ρ, while b, c, z T , ρ 0 are given measurable functions, the rests, with c(t) ∈ P 0 (Σ). We state an immediate but useful estimate regarding the first of the two equations in (79).
Lemma 2. If (RegFG) holds then the equation
has a unique solution for each final condition z T (x) and satisfies
Proof. The well-posedness of the equation is immediate from classical ODE's theory. Integrating over the time interval [t, T ] and using that
we find
Substituting the expression for z(T, x), and using the bound on the control and on the derivatives of F and G we can estimate
and thus, applying Gronwall's Lemma and taking the supremum on t we get (81).
In the next result we prove the well-posedness of system (79) together with useful a priori estimates on its solution. 
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume t 0 = 0. We use a fixed-point argument to prove the existence of a solution to (79). Uniqueness will be then implied by estimates (82) and (83), thanks to the linearity of the system.
We define the map T :
we consider the solution z = z(ρ) to equation (80), and define T (ρ) to be the solution of the second equation in (79) with z = z(ρ). In order to prove the existence of a fixed point of T , which is clearly a solution to (79), we apply Leray-Schauder Fixed Point Theorem. We remark the fact that more standard fixed point theorems are not applicable to this situation since we can not assume that ρ belongs to a compact subspace of C 0 ([0, T ]; P 0 (Σ)). First of all, we note that C 0 ([0, T ]; P 0 (Σ)) is convex and that the map T is trivially continuous (for the linearity of the system). Moreover, using the equation for ρ in system (79), it is easy to see that T is a compact map, i.e. it sends bounded sets of
. Thus, to apply Leray-Schauder Theorem it remains to prove that the set
First, we note that we can restrict to λ > 0, since otherwise ρ = 0. Therefore, we can use the equations (for brevity we omit the dependence of α * on the second variable) to get
The second line is 0, using the fact that x ρ x (t) = 0 and changing x and y in the second double sum. Integrating over [0, T ] and using the expression for z(T, x) we obtain
where in the third term of the sum we have also used that
Dividing by λ > 0 and bringing the terms with F and G on the left hand side, together with the term in m and D p α * , we can rewrite
We now observe that, by (Mon)) and (RegFG), we have
Furthermore assumption (12) yields
so that we can estimate the previous equality by We can further estimate the right hand side using the bound ||z|| ≤ C(|z T | + ||ρ|| + ||b||) of Lemma 2:
||ρ|| ≤ C(||c|| + |ρ 0 |) Given the solution (u, m) to the system (MFG), with initial condition m 0 for m and final condition G for u, we introduce the linearized system: µ(t 0 ) = µ 0 ∈ P 0 (Σ).
We observe that in the RHS of the first equation D m F (x, m(t), 1) · µ(t) = D m F (x, m(t), j) · µ(t) for every j ∈ Σ, using identity (8) and the fact that µ(t) ∈ P 0 (Σ) for every t (i.e. identity (10) 
Conclusions
Let us summarize the results we have obtained. The two set of assumptions are given in Section 2.2 and verified in Example 2.1.
(1) If (H1) holds and there exists a regular solution U to the Master Equation (M), in the sense of Definition 3, then the value functions of the N -player game converge to U (Theorem 1) and the optimal trajectories (28) satisfy a propagation of chaos property, i.e they converge to the limiting i.i.d solution to (29) (Theorem 2); (2) Under the assumptions for convergence, the empirical measure process (47) associated with the optimal trajectories satisfies a Central limit Theorem (Theorem 4) and a Large Deviation Principle with rate function I in (63) (Theorem 5); (3) Assuming (RegH), (Mon) and (RegFG), there exists a unique classical solution to (M) and it is also regular in the sense of Definition 3.
